CVE-2026-123158: OpenSSH Password Auth Bypass on musl

5 min read

CVE-2026-123158 is a password authentication bypass in sshd from portable OpenSSH. It affects Linux systems where OpenSSH is linked against musl libc and runs with PAM disabled. Alpine Linux is the main example. Under the right account setup, a remote attacker who can reach the SSH port can log in to an account that has no usable password at all. Upstream fixed it in OpenSSH 10.6p2, released on 2026-11-05. The report came from Özgün Kültekin of Wakefield.

NVD published the CVE on 2026-11-05. The CNA (MITRE) scores it 8.1 (High) under CVSS 3.1 with vector CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H and maps it to CWE-394 (Unexpected Status Code or Return Value). As of today the NVD record still has the status "Received".

What goes wrong

An sshd built without PAM checks passwords itself. It hashes the submitted password with crypt() and compares the result with the stored hash. According to the OpenSSH maintainers, the root cause is in musl's crypt(), which returns an error value that can match the placeholder stored for accounts with no usable password (for example *). sshd then treats the comparison as a match. Upstream calls the bug "outside sshd" but exploitable through it, so 10.6p2 adds a check in sshd that rejects stored password hashes too short to be a real hash (fewer than four characters).

Alpine's advisory lists what has to be true for a system to be exposed: password authentication enabled (the default), at least one account with a * password field, such as root in base images or key-only users, and at least one local account with a SHA-crypt hash. Alpine also notes that its official tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship an alpine user that matches this pattern and has passwordless doas.

Exploitation status

CISA added CVE-2026-123158 to the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2026-11-09 with a due date of 2026-11-12. Whether it has been used in ransomware campaigns is listed as "Unknown". The KEV entry also says forensic triage is required under BOD 26-04, so an exposed system should be treated as a possible incident, not just a patch job.

Who is affected

ComponentStatus
Upstream OpenSSH before 10.6p2, Linux, musl libc, PAM disabledAffected
Upstream OpenSSH 10.6p2Fixed
Debian 13 (trixie) opensshOpen, no fixed version yet, urgency "unimportant"

The Debian security tracker lists the trixie package as vulnerable with no fix, but rates it "unimportant". Debian's own sshd is built against glibc and uses PAM, which is not the configuration upstream describes. You can check both on a host:

ldd /usr/sbin/sshd | grep -E 'libc|libpam'
sshd -T | grep -E '^(usepam|passwordauthentication) '

The real risk for Debian 13 admins is in what runs on top of the host: Alpine-based Docker or Podman containers that run their own sshd, Alpine VMs, and appliances built on musl. Those follow Alpine's fix status, not Debian's. Alpine's advisory lists fixed packages for each branch.

What admins should do now

On the Debian 13 host itself there is nothing to install yet. Keep an eye on the tracker and install the update when it lands:

apt update
apt list --upgradable 2>/dev/null | grep -i openssh
apt policy openssh-server

Next, find musl-based sshd instances. For containers on the host:

docker ps --format '{{.Names}} {{.Image}}'
docker exec CONTAINER cat /etc/alpine-release
docker exec CONTAINER apk info -v openssh-server

Inside Alpine, upgrade openssh and restart the daemon. Alpine points out that the package upgrade does not restart a running sshd, so the old binary keeps serving connections until you restart it. Rebuild images from a fixed base instead of patching running containers by hand.

If you can't upgrade right away, upstream and Alpine both give the same workaround: turn off password authentication. Test key-based login in a second session before you restart sshd.

PasswordAuthentication no
KbdInteractiveAuthentication no
sshd -t
sshd -T | grep -E '^passwordauthentication '

Key-only login is a good default anyway. See the baseline in hardening SSH on Debian 13 with OpenSSH 10, and FIDO2 ed25519-sk keys if you want hardware-backed keys.

Because the bug is listed as exploited, also look at past logins. Alpine recommends looking for Accepted password for entries for accounts that have no password, such as root, alpine or key-only users. After that, review doas use, new accounts, new files and changes to authorized_keys. On Alpine the log is usually /var/log/messages:

grep 'Accepted password for' /var/log/messages

Alpine's advice is to treat the machine as compromised if a suspicious login can't be ruled out.

What we don't know yet

  • When Debian will ship a trixie update, or whether it will ship one at all, since the tracker rates the issue "unimportant" for Debian's build.
  • CISA has not said who is exploiting the bug or against what kind of targets. Ransomware use is "Unknown".
  • The oldest affected upstream version. Upstream and NVD only say "before 10.6p2".
  • NVD has not finished analysing the record. Its own CVSS score may differ from the CNA score.
  • Whether musl-based distributions or appliances other than Alpine ship sshd without PAM in an exposed configuration.

Sources